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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington 25, D. C.

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12 November 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee

Subject: Proposed Changes to CIA Draft NSCID No. 5, dated  
14 October 1957

Reference: Memo to IAC from Secy, IAC, dated 8 Nov 57, Subj:  
Comments on Proposed Revision of NSCID No. 5

1. Changes which I propose in draft NSCID No. 5 fall generally into four areas, appropriately identified by subject, as set forth in the following paragraphs, with reasons appended.

2. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE:

a. TITLE: Change to read "U. S. Clandestine Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Activities Abroad."

b. Subparagraph 3d--Delete.

c. Paragraph 9 - Delete.

REASON: Reference to "counter-intelligence" not limited to "clandestine" in the title, and inclusion of paragraphs 3d and 9, appear to be an attempt to cover in this directive the whole problem of a U. S. national counter-intelligence policy abroad. Primarily, this NSCID is concerned with clandestine matters. Since this is so, to cause it to apply also to counter-intelligence activity in general, apparently on the ground that part of such activity is clandestine, is a shift in emphasis not warranted by the relative scope of non-clandestine, as against clandestine, counter-intelligence. It is making the clandestine tail wag the counter-intelligence dog. The subject of U. S. counter-intelligence abroad should be dealt with in greater scope than appears here, as is implied by the wording "to ensure conformity with policies enunciated by the National Security Council" in paragraph 9a.

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Gen. Collins proposal to delete reference to "national clandestine ~~service~~ in para. 3. and change "additional" to "supplemental" in para. 4.a.

Para. 3. has been revised and suggested word change has been adopted.

Gen. Collins proposal to : Change title and delete paras. 3.d. and 9.

Do not agree. Scope of non-clandestine CI versus clandestine CI is not the issue - The CIA view is that the degree of problem area in the non-clandestine CI field that requires attention at the IAC level is minimal and therefor can be handled by the broad provisions set out in para 9 - any problems which do arise can be handled by the issuance of DCID's. It is the CIA contention that non-clandestine CI is largely ~~an~~ a departmental and command matter which can readily be handled unilaterally by the chiefs of intelligence concerned at the Washington level or by the respective commanders in the field.

Gen. Collins proposals on para. 7.:

In 1st line change word "areas" to the singular.

In 5th line add the words "activities and" before "operations".

Delete the words "which significantly affect the missions of such commanders."

All these proposals have been adopted.

Counter-intelligence deserves a separate NSCID, to include not only measures for coordination, but also for integration of operations, formulation of broad objectives, policies and plans, and for allocation or assignment of responsibilities.

3. NATIONAL CLANDESTINE SERVICE:

a. Change preamble, paragraph 3, to read as follows: "~~The Central Intelligence Agency is the national clandestine service of the United States and~~ has primary..."

b. Paragraph 4a: Change "additional" to "supplemental."

REASON: Although it is possible that a useful purpose is served in this directive by styling CIA the "national clandestine service," it seems not only unnecessary, but also inappropriate to do so for two reasons:

- a. It adds nothing to the force of the directive.
- b. It records, by implication, CIA as having exclusive or preclusive operational capability in the field, and hence that what the Services do is duplicatory. This sentiment is incompatible with the spirit of paragraph 4, and beclouds its intent. At a time, moreover, when Bureau of the Budget is exploring means of effecting economies and simplifying budgetary procedures, its inclusion may prejudice not only Service budgeting for clandestine activities but also the Service right to use this means of collection.

Use of the word "additional" is an extension of the implication that CIA has a preclusive operational capability in the clandestine field, and that Service activities, being additional, are duplicatory. "Supplemental," however, places Service clandestine activity in its proper context, i. e., CIA activity is a service of common concern which has to be "supplemented" for departmental purposes, rather than "added to."

4. FOREIGN AREA IN PEACE - COORDINATION OF CIA ACTIVITIES WITH THE MILITARY:

a. Paragraph 7 - 1st line: Change "In foreign areas" to "In a foreign area."

Gen. Collins proposal on para. 8.

We have revised para. 8 to accommodate the proposals of both Gen. Collins and [redacted]. The new wording emphasizes the fact that CIA will be under the "direct command" of the theater commander but also preserves the key point of the command relationships agreement by indicating that CIA will operate as a "component force".

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REASON: To point up applicability of the directive to all major commands in a single area, and to make consistent in format with the preceding paragraph.

b. Second line - page 5: Insert words "activities and" before the word "operations."

REASON: "Activities" is broader than "operations." The commander should know of the existence of an activity, the knowledge of which by unauthorized persons might affect, or even prejudice, the successful accomplishment of his own missions. It is not enough to know only the "what," "where," and "when," of an operation. The "how" or "with what" should also be available.

c. Third and 4th lines - page 5: Delete "which significantly affect the missions of such commanders."

REASON: This clause is a qualification to "appropriately" in the third line above and narrows the interpretation of that word. As such, it moves into the area of how, or subject to what criteria, the DCI representative will coordinate with the military, and more properly should be in a DCID. It is not felt that this is the sole criterion under which coordination will be effected, or not effected, as the case might be.

5. MILITARY COMMAND AUTHORITY IN AN ACTIVE THEATER OF WAR:

Amend paragraph 8 to read: "In active theaters of war where U. S. forces are engaged or when the President so directs, the entire CIA organization shall be under the direct command of the United States theater commander in accordance with agreements separately reached between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As an exception to the foregoing, CIA operations which, because of delicate political or diplomatic implications, must be conducted independently, but which are within, mounted from, or staged through the theater, shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct the military support required and will provide the necessary guidance to the theater commander."

REASON: Direct reference to the "Command Relationships Agreement" is unnecessary and inappropriate in an NSC document if the means by which such agreement is achieved is set out. The basis upon which such an agreement is made, i. e., a clear statement of command authority, must, however, be included. The concept of "exceptional operations" is

a qualification to military command authority, which should be expressed here, and in the same terms as in the agreement separately reached. No further qualification to military command authority in war in respect to liaison procedures should be memorialized here, as this refers to a limitation on the theater commander's authority in the operation of his own command, as distinct from an exception made to it in the case of a Washington-directed operation.

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The Joint Staff